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Abstract
We present a technique for measuring the security of a system which relies on a probabilistic process
algebraic formalisation of noninterference. We deﬁne a mathematical model for this technique which
consists of a linear space of processes and linear transformations on them. In this model the measured
quantity corresponds to the norm of a suitably deﬁned linear operator associated to the system. The
probabilistic model we adopt is reactive in the sense that processes can react to the environment with
a probabilistic choice on a set of inputs; it is also generative in the sense that outputs autonomously
chosen by the system are governed by a probability distribution. In this setting, noninterference is
formulated in terms of a probabilistic notion of weak bisimulation. We show how the probabilistic
information in this notion can be used to estimate the maximal information leakage, i.e. the security
degree of a system against a most powerful attacker.
Key words: Probabilistic Noninterference, Process Algebra, Similarity Relation,
Weak Bisimulation
1 Introduction
Several characterisations of the security of a system against illegal information ﬂows from a
high-security level enclave to a low-security level enclave have been proposed in the literature,
which employ qualitative methods based, e.g., on a logical interpretation of the noninterference
idea by Goguen and Meseguer [GM82]. This idea ultimately depends on some notion of indis-
tinguishability of process behaviours (see, e.g., [FG95,RS01]). However, in many practical situ-
ations the complete absence of any information ﬂow is diﬃcult to be guaranteed and it is more
realistic to assume that some amount of information leakage can be tolerated [Gra90,R+01]. In
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such a scenario security is not an absolute requirement and approximated versions of security
properties would be more appropriate. The latter would also allow us to estimate the diﬀer-
ence between the real system of interest and an idealised perfectly secure system by means of
a measure of the approximation.
On the basis of such considerations, in [A+03] it is shown how a security property termed
Probabilistic Noninterference (PNI) can be used for establishing the security of a system in an
approximated way. PNI extends with probabilities a nondeterministic notion of noninterfer-
ence [FG95], which checks whether, from the viewpoint of a low-level observer, the behaviour
of the system is invariant with respect to the behaviour of high-level users interacting with
the system. The particular class of high-level users considered by PNI, denoted APNI, can
be viewed as a family of probabilistic adversaries that try to set up a covert communication
channel from high level to low level by aﬀecting the behaviour of the system. Such adversaries
are memoryless in the sense that their probabilistic behaviour is ﬁxed at the beginning and
does not change during the system execution. Formally, for each H 2 APNI, an equivalence
check is performed between the process modelling the behaviour of the system without high-
level interferences and the process modelling the behaviour of the system interacting with H.
If such low-level views of the system are equivalent, then a low-level observer cannot infer any-
thing about the activity of H or, in other words, H cannot aﬀect the low-level behaviour of the
system (see [A+03] and the references therein). The main idea behind an approximated notion
of probabilistic noninterference is to replace equivalence by similarity. This allows for some
tolerance in the comparison of the two low-level views of the system rather than giving a binary
answer to the potential equality between them. In this paper we concentrate on the problem of
estimating such a tolerance factor in terms of “how much” similar two probabilistic processes
are. The relaxed notion of indistinguishability we propose implies the one described in [A+03]
and allows us to apply a methodology to detect the most powerful adversary; this corresponds
to the high-level user of APNI that maximises the diﬀerence between the two low-level views
considered by PNI.
The criterion we adopt to establish the indistinguishability of two probabilistic processes
refers to a probabilistic notion of weak bisimulation [BH97]. An approximated version of non-
interference can be formalised through the deﬁnition of a corresponding similarity relation. We
deﬁne such a relation in terms of the observable diﬀerence between two processes, where ob-
servability is based on the weak probabilistic bisimulation semantics. The maximal observable
diﬀerence between processes will give us a measure of their indistinguishability, that is in our
formalisation of noninterferference a measure of the information leakage.
A formal justiﬁcation of such quantity is given in a mathematical framework in which the
operational semantics of the probabilistic calculus is deﬁned in terms of linear operators on a
vector space representing the state space. In this setting we show that the metric induced by a
particular operator norm on the process terms corresponds to a notion of distance which coin-
cides with the measure above. This result exploits techniques introduced in [DHW02,DHW03].
The probabilistic model we adopt was introduced in [BB00] and used in [A+03,ABG03] to
formalise the PNI property. This model includes both probabilities and nondeterminism. On
the one hand, a probability distribution is used to govern the choice among the various output
actions that can be autonomously performed by the system. On the other hand, the choice
among diﬀerent types of input actions that can be accepted by the system depends on the
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environment behaviour. Therefore, such choices are nondeterministic. More precisely, once the
environment has decided which type of input will be activated, the system reacts according
to a speciﬁed probability distribution associated with the input actions of that type. Thus,
the model is a mixed generative-reactive model, where output operations follow the generative
model of probabilities and input operations follow the reactive model of probabilities [GSS95].
The presence of nondeterminism in the model is in a sense not compatible with our quanti-
tative approach which requires that all transition probabilities are speciﬁed in order to calculate
the behavioural diﬀerence between processes. In fact, in our security analysis nondeterminism
is resolved by the probabilistic adversaries in APNI, which play the role of probabilistic sched-
ulers. Such schedulers are responsible of the information that may ﬂow from the high to the
low level, and therefore represent the “attackers” in our model of security.
In the rest of the paper, we ﬁrst describe the formal model surveyed above (Section 2) and
then present the PNI property and its application to an exact veriﬁcation of the system security
(Section 3), as done in [A+03,ABG03]. In Section 4 we introduce the main contribution of this
paper by presenting our quantitative approach towards measuring noninterference. In Section 5
we show that the quantity introduced as a measure for noninterference can be formalised in
terms of the metric on probabilistic processes induced by a particular operator norm. Finally,
in Section 6 we conclude by discussing some related work.
2 The Probabilistic Model
In this section we present the probabilistic framework in which we formalise a quantitative
approach to noninterference. In particular, we consider a probabilistic calculus that was intro-
duced in [BA03] and used in [ABG03] to deﬁne a probabilistic extension of the nondeterministic
approach to noninterference of [FG95]. Such a calculus derives from a simple nondeterministic
process algebra where actions are syntactically divided into input actions and output actions.
Formally, for each visible action of type a, we distinguish the output action a and the input
action a¤. Process terms synchronously communicate with the environment through their in-
puts and outputs, and perform internal computations through unobservable actions, termed ¿
actions.
Probabilities are introduced by adding probabilistic information to the algebraic operators.
As an example, the classical CCS choice operator P + Q is replaced by a probabilistic choice
operator P +p Q, where p is the parameter of a probability distribution that guides the choice
between P (chosen with probability p) and Q (chosen with probability 1 ¡ p).
As far as the model of probabilities is concerned, we adopt a mixture of the generative and
reactive approaches of [GSS95]. We assume that output actions behave as generative actions,
i.e. the system autonomously decides, on the basis of a probability distribution, which output
action will be oﬀered to the environment and how to behave after such an event. In particular,
¿ is a generative action, since it expresses an autonomous internal move that does not react to
external stimuli. For example, the process a:P +p ¿:Q will either execute a with probability p
and then proceed as P, or execute ¿ with probability 1 ¡ p and then proceed as Q.
Input actions are modelled as reactive actions, i.e. the system internally reacts to the choice
of an action type performed by the environment. Once the action type has been (nondeter-
ministically) chosen, a particular reactive action of that type is executed on the basis of a
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probability distribution. Thus, we can see the input actions as underspeciﬁed, since their exe-
cution is guided by the environment behaviour. For example, the process b¤:P +p(a¤:Q+qa¤:R)
will react to one of two action types, a or b, which can be selected by the environment. Note
that such a choice is purely nondeterministic and does not depend on the probability distribu-
tion speciﬁed by parameter p. If the chosen event is a, the system performs one of the possible
reactive input actions a¤ according to the probability distribution speciﬁed by parameter q.
Instead, if the chosen event is b, the system reacts by executing the unique reactive input action
b¤ it can perform with probability 1.
In the following, we present the syntax and the semantics of the probabilistic calculus.
The interested reader is referred to [A+03,ABG03,BA03,BB00] for more details. Then, we
describe a notion of process equivalence [BH97] based on a probabilistic extension of the weak
bisimulation of [Mil89].
2.1 Syntax
The syntax of the probabilistic process calculus is as follows:
P ::= 0j¼:P jP +
p P jP k
p
S P jPnLjP=
p
a jA:
We use 0 to represent the terminated process (we usually omit it).
Action ¼ is drawn from the set of actions Act and can be an internal action ¿, an output
action a, or an input action a¤, where a belongs to the set of visible action types AType. ¼:P
performs the action ¼ with probability 1 and then behaves like P.
The alternative choice operator P +p Q, where p 2 (0;1), performs a mixed probabilis-
tic/nondeterministic choice among the actions of P and Q. More precisely, P +p Q executes a
generative (reactive of type a) action of P with probability p and a generative (reactive of type
a) action of Q with probability 1¡p. If one process P or Q cannot execute generative (reactive
of type a) actions, P +p Q chooses a generative (reactive of type a) action of the other process
with probability 1. The choice among generative and reactive actions and among reactive ac-
tions of diﬀerent types is purely nondeterministic. Hence, the parameter that probabilistically
guides the choices comes into play if and only if a probabilistic choice is actually performed.
The parallel composition operator P k
p
S Q, where p 2 (0;1) and S µ AType, asynchronously
performs all the actions of P and Q that do not belong to the synchronisation set S and imposes
synchronisation for all the actions belonging to S. Two actions can synchronise if they are of
the same type a and either they are both input actions (and the result is an input action of
type a), or one of them is an output action and the other one is an input action (and the result
is an output action of type a). The probabilistic choice mechanism among the actions of P and
Q is the same as described in the case of the choice operator. Because of the synchronisation
policy, the execution of some actions of P may be prevented in P k
p
S Q. Thus, we normalise
the probabilities of the generative actions of P executable by P k
p
S Q in order to obtain a
probability distribution. A symmetric argument holds for Q.
The restriction operator PnL prevents the execution of the actions of type in L µ AType.
The semantics of this operator can be expressed in terms of the parallel operator. In fact, we
have that PnL corresponds to P k
p
L 0, for any choice of parameter p.
The hiding operator P=p
a turns visible actions of type a into internal actions ¿. In particular,
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when hiding an action a¤, we must pay attention to the side eﬀect caused by the fact that a
reactive action becomes a generative action. To this purpose, we use parameter p to express the
probability that generative actions ¿ obtained by hiding reactive actions a¤ of P are executed
with respect to the generative actions previously enabled by P. Obviously, p is not used
when hiding generative actions, because in such a particular case no nondeterminism must be
resolved.
Example 2.1 Consider the process P deﬁned by a +q b, where the probabilistic choice is
governed by parameter q. The semantics of P=p
a is given by ¿ +qb, i.e. it is again a probabilistic
choice governed by parameter q. In such a case, parameter p of the hiding operator is not used
since no nondeterministic choice must be resolved.
Now, consider process P given by a¤ +q b, where the choice is purely nondeterministic
(parameter q is not considered). The semantics of P=p
a is the probabilistic choice ¿ +p b,
governed by parameter p, between ¿ (obtained by hiding a¤) and b.
By turning reactive actions into generative invisible actions, the hiding operator allows us
to obtain closed (fully generative) systems from open systems (i.e., systems enabling reactive
choices). In order to obtain a closed system, the nondeterministic choices due to possible
interactions with the environment have to be resolved, and parameter p turns such choices into
probabilistic choices. In this sense, the hiding operator allows us to obtain a more concrete
(fully speciﬁed) system which is an essential requirement for a quantitative reasoning about
the system.
Constants A are used to specify recursive systems. In general, when deﬁning a process
term, we assume a set of constants deﬁning equations of the form A
∆ = P (with P a guarded
term [Mil89]) to be given.
In the rest of the paper, we denote by G the set of ﬁnite state, guarded, and closed
terms [Mil89], called processes, generated by the syntax above. Moreover, we assume p = 1
2 in
the case parameter p of a probabilistic operator is omitted.
2.2 Operational Semantics
The semantics of the probabilistic process calculus is expressed in terms of mixed genera-
tive/reactive transition systems, which we now introduce. To this aim, we assume the follow-
ing notation. Sets RAct and GAct denote the sets of input actions and of output and internal
actions, respectively. We use the abbreviation P
¼
¡ ¡ ¡! for P
¼;p
¡ ¡ ¡! P 0, denoting that P can
execute action ¼ with probability p and then behave as P 0, for some p 2]0;1] and some process
P 0. We also use P
G
¡ ¡ ¡! , with G µ GAct, to indicate P
a
¡ ¡ ¡! , for some a 2 G, denoting that
P can execute a generative action belonging to the set G.
The operational semantics of the probabilistic process algebra is given by the labeled tran-
sition system (G;Act;T), called generative/reactive transition system, where states are process
terms and the transition relation T is the least multiset satisfying the operational rules reported
in Table 1 and in Table 2. As far as the rules for P +pQ and P k
p
S Q are concerned, in addition
to the reported rules, which refer to the local moves of the left-hand process P, we also consider
the symmetric rules taking into account the local moves of the right-hand process Q. Such
symmetric rules are obtained by exchanging the roles of terms P and Q in the premises and
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by replacing p with 1 ¡ p in the label of the derived transitions.
The semantics rules reﬂect the informal presentation of the syntax of the operators. Here,
we go through some details concerning the parallel operator. If both P and Q can execute
some synchronising actions a¤ in P k
p
S Q, then the composed system can execute some actions
a¤: the probability of each action a¤ executable by P k
p
S Q is the product of the probabilities
of the two actions a¤ (one of P and one of Q) that are involved in the synchronisation. The
probabilities of the generative actions of P (Q) that are executable by P k
p
S Q are normalised in
order to obtain a probability distribution [GSS95]. To this purpose, we employ some additional
notation.
² The set GS;Q = fa 2 AType [f¿gja 62 S _(a 2 S ^Q
a¤
¡ ¡ ¡! )g contains the action types not
belonging to set S and the action types belonging to S for which an input action of Q can
be performed. Intuitively, GS;Q contains all the types of the actions that any process P can
execute within P k
p
S Q.
² The function ºP(GS;Q) : P(AType [ f¿g) ¡!]0;1] computes the sum of the probabilities of
the generative actions of P with type in GS;Q. The value ºP(GS;Q) is used to normalise the
probabilities of the generative actions of P executable by P k
p
S Q.
2.3 Weak Probabilistic Bisimulation
The security analysis we conduct is based on the semantics of processes (i.e., the security check
considers the program behaviour), so that we need an equivalence relation allowing for a com-
parison among the observable behaviours of diﬀerent systems. As argued in [Smith03,ABG03]
a natural notion of observational equivalence on which to base notions of conﬁnement is weak
bisimulation: a semantics based on weak bisimulation allows us to neglect details about the
internal behaviour of a system which are not important for a security analysis (such as the
running time of a concurrent thread) and to concentrate only on those behaviours which are
interesting for the analysis (e.g. behaviours which are observable from an external or low-level
viewpoint). We consider here a probabilistic variant of the weak bisimulation which was in-
troduced in [BH97]. Such a relation, denoted by ¼PB, is a probabilistic extension of the weak
bisimulation (¼B) of [Mil89]. In essence, ¼PB replaces the classical weak transitions of ¼B
by the probability of reaching classes of equivalent states. More precisely, we use a function
Prob such that Prob(P;¼;C) denotes the aggregate probability of going from P to a term in
the class (of equivalent terms) C by executing an action ¼, and Prob(P;¿¤a;C) expresses the
aggregate probability of going from P to a term in the equivalence class C via sequences of
any number of ¿ actions followed by an action a, possibly equal to ¿.
Lemma 2.2 The value of Prob(P;¿¤a;C) is the minimal non-negative solution to the equation
system:
8
> > > <
> > > :
1 if a = ¿ ^ P 2 C
P
Q2G Prob(P;¿;Q) ¢ Prob(Q;¿¤;C) if a = ¿ ^ P 62 C
P
Q2G Prob(P;¿;Q) ¢ Prob(Q;¿¤a;C) + Prob(P;a;C) if a 6= ¿
As shown in [ABG03], this system has a least solution. We are now ready to deﬁne the
6Aldini, Di Pierro
¼:P
¼;1
¡ ¡ ¡! P
P
a¤;q
¡ ¡ ¡! P 0 Q
a¤
¡ ¡ ¡!
P +p Q
a¤;p¢q
¡ ¡ ¡! P 0
P
a¤;q
¡ ¡ ¡! P 0 Q
a¤
¡ ¡ ¡! =
P +p Q
a¤;q
¡ ¡ ¡! P 0
P
a;q
¡ ¡ ¡! P 0 Q
GAct
¡ ¡ ¡!
P +p Q
a;p¢q
¡ ¡ ¡! P 0
P
a;q
¡ ¡ ¡! P 0 Q
GAct
¡ ¡ ¡! =
P +p Q
a;q
¡ ¡ ¡! P 0
P
a¤;q
¡ ¡ ¡! P 0 P
GAct
¡ ¡ ¡!
P=p
a
¿;p¢q
¡ ¡ ¡! P 0=p
a
P
a¤;q
¡ ¡ ¡! P 0 P
GAct
¡ ¡ ¡! =
P=p
a
¿;q
¡ ¡ ¡! P 0=p
a
P
b¤;q
¡ ¡ ¡! P 0
P=p
a
b¤;q
¡ ¡ ¡! P 0=p
a
a 6= b
P
b;q
¡ ¡ ¡! P 0 P
a¤
¡ ¡ ¡!
P=p
a
b;(1¡p)¢q
¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡! P 0=p
a
a 6= b
P
a;q
¡ ¡ ¡! P 0 P
a¤
¡ ¡ ¡!
P=p
a
¿;(1¡p)¢q
¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡! P 0=p
a
P
b;q
¡ ¡ ¡! P 0 P
a¤
¡ ¡ ¡! =
P=p
a
b;q
¡ ¡ ¡! P 0=p
a
a 6= b
P
a;q
¡ ¡ ¡! P 0 P
a¤
¡ ¡ ¡! =
P=p
a
¿;q
¡ ¡ ¡! P 0=p
a
P
¼;q
¡ ¡ ¡! P 0
A
¼;q
¡ ¡ ¡! P 0
if A
∆ = P
Table 1
Operational semantics (part I)
weak probabilistic bisimulation equivalence.
Deﬁnition 2.3 An equivalence relation R µ G £G is a weak probabilistic bisimulation if and
only if, whenever (P;Q) 2 R, then for all C 2 G=R:
² Prob(P;¿¤a;C) = Prob(Q;¿¤a;C) 8a 2 GAct
² Prob(P;a¤;C) = Prob(Q;a¤;C) 8a¤ 2 RAct:
Two terms P;Q 2 G are weakly probabilistically bisimulation equivalent, denoted P ¼PB Q, if
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P
a¤;q
¡ ¡ ¡! P 0 Q
a¤
¡ ¡ ¡!
P k
p
S Q
a¤;p¢q
¡ ¡ ¡! P 0 k
p
S Q
a 62 S
P
a¤;q
¡ ¡ ¡! P 0 Q
a¤
¡ ¡ ¡! =
P k
p
S Q
a¤;q
¡ ¡ ¡! P 0 k
p
S Q
a 62 S
P
a¤;q
¡ ¡ ¡! P 0 Q
a¤;q0
¡ ¡ ¡! Q0
P k
p
S Q
a¤;q¢q0
¡ ¡ ¡! P 0 k
p
S Q0
a 2 S
P
a;q
¡ ¡ ¡! P 0 Q
GS;P
¡ ¡ ¡!
P k
p
S Q
a;p¢q=ºP(GS;Q)
¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡! P 0 k
p
S Q
a 62 S
P
a;q
¡ ¡ ¡! P 0 Q
GS;P
¡ ¡ ¡! =
P k
p
S Q
a;q=ºP(GS;Q)
¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡! P 0 k
p
S Q
a 62 S
P
a;q
¡ ¡ ¡! P 0 Q
a¤;q0
¡ ¡ ¡! Q0 Q
GS;P
¡ ¡ ¡!
P k
p
S Q
a;p¢q0¢q=ºP(GS;Q)
¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡! P 0 k
p
S Q0
a 2 S
P
a;q
¡ ¡ ¡! P 0 Q
a¤;q0
¡ ¡ ¡! Q0 Q
GS;P
¡ ¡ ¡! =
P k
p
S Q
a;q0¢q=ºP(GS;Q)
¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡! P 0 k
p
S Q0
a 2 S
Table 2
Operational semantics (part II)
there exists a weak probabilistic bisimulation R including the pair (P;Q).
Note that such a deﬁnition requires two equivalent terms to be strongly equivalent in
the case of reactive actions and weakly equivalent in the case of generative actions. This is
because ¿ is a generative action, therefore computing the probability associated with a mixed
trace of generative/reactive actions (like, e.g., ¿¤a¤) does not actually make sense. Note also
that, as shown in [BH97], the ﬁrst equation in Deﬁnition 2.3 can be equivalently written as
Prob(P;¿¤a¿¤;C) = Prob(Q;¿¤a¿¤;C).
Example 2.4 Processes P
∆ = a +
1
2 b and Q
∆ = ¿:Q +
1
3 (a +
1
2 b) behave the same from the
viewpoint of an external observer, who can see either an output action a or an output action b
with equal probabilities. Formally, P and Q are weakly probabilistically bisimulation equivalent
and the relation that satisﬁes Deﬁnition 2.3 is R = fC;[0]g, with C = fP;Qg and [0] = f0g.
The only interesting case to be veriﬁed is related to the execution of a visible action (possibly
preceded by a sequence of internal actions) starting from the initial state and reaching the
null term. As it is easy to see, we have Prob(P;¿¤¼;[0]) = 1
2, with ¼ 2 fa;bg. As far as
Prob(Q;¿¤¼;[0]) is concerned, we observe that Q can execute an arbitrary number of times
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the action ¿ before reaching state 0 via an action a (b). Hence, the probability 1
3 associated
with the outgoing internal transition of Q is distributed among the other outgoing transitions
of Q. Formally, by resolving the equation system of Lemma 2.2, we have Prob(Q;¿¤a;[0]) =
1
3 ¢Prob(Q;¿¤a;[0])+ 1
3, from which we derive Prob(Q;¿¤a;[0]) = 1
2 (similarly for b). Therefore,
R is a weak probabilistic bisimulation and P ¼PB Q.
3 Probabilistic Noninterference
According to the standard deﬁnition of noninterference given by Goguen and Meseguer [GM82],
a high-level user (High, for short) is said to interfere with a low-level user (Low, for short) if
what High can do is reﬂected on what Low can observe. In this setting, High can perform high-
level activities only and observe all the interactions between the system and the environment.
Instead, Low can perform low-level activities only and is not allowed to directly observe the
occurrence of high-level events. In spite of this, Low may succeed in detecting the High
behaviour by simply interacting with the low-level interface of the system. In other words,
even if there does not exist a direct communication channel from High to Low, High may
have the possibility of indirectly passing information to Low through interactions with the
system. Noninterference analysis mainly aims at checking the presence of indirect information
ﬂows, called covert channels, from High to Low. In our probabilistic framework, what Low
can see in order to infer the High behaviour is not only the logical low-level interface of the
system interacting with the environment, but also the probability distribution of the events
representing such interactions. In this section we describe a formalisation of the noninterference
approach in the probabilistic process calculus surveyed in the previous section [A+03,ABG03].
The noninterference-based security analysis roughly consists of deriving two models from
the system speciﬁcation at hand, corresponding to two diﬀerent low-level views of the system,
and then checking the semantic equivalence between such derived models. The semantic equiv-
alence between processes is based on the weak probabilistic bisimulation ¼PB, introduced in
Section 2.3, while the choice of the low-level models to be compared depends on the deﬁnition
of the security property. The property we consider here was introduced in [ABG03] as a prob-
abilistic extension of the Strong Nondeterministic Noninterference property of [FG95]. Such
a property, which we call Probabilistic Noninterference (PNI), compares the low-level view of
the system in the absence of high-level interactions and the low-level view of the system in the
presence of high-level interactions.
Formally, we divide actions into high-level actions and low-level actions, denoted High
and Low, respectively, depending on the nature of the activities they represent. High and
Low are two disjoint sets that form a covering of AType. Given a process P, we denote
with ¯ hP = hP
1 ;:::;hP
n the sequence (in alphabetic order) of types of the high-level actions
that syntactically occur in the action preﬁx operators within P. Then, the application of
the security check to P is as follows. The low-level view of P in the absence of high-level
operations is obtained by preventing P from executing its high-level actions. This is carried
out by applying the restriction operator to P, i.e. PnHigh. The low-level view of P in the
presence of high-level interactions is obtained by turning all the high-level actions of P into
invisible actions, since Low is not expected to observe them. This is carried out by applying the
hiding operator to P, thus obtaining a family of processes P=
p1
hP
1 :::=
pn
hP
n, with p1;:::;pn 2 (0;1),
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where each possible sequence ¯ p = p1;:::;pn expresses the probability distribution (chosen by
High) of the hidden high-level input actions executable by P. In the following, we sometimes
use the abbreviation P=
¯ p
¯ hP to stand for P=
p1
hP
1
:::=
pn
hP
n. Finally, for each possible ¯ p, we compare
PnHigh and P=
¯ p
¯ hP to check whether they are weak probabilistic bisimilar. If such a condition
holds we say that P satisﬁes the PNI property, or P 2 PNI.
Deﬁnition 3.1 P 2 PNI , PnHigh ¼PB P=
p1
hP
1
:::=
pn
hP
n 8p1;:::;pn 2 (0;1):
Note that the sequence ¯ p = p1;:::;pn represents the particular probabilistic behaviour (i.e.
the strategy) followed by High. Hence, the universal quantiﬁcation over all possible sequences
imposes that the equivalence check must hold for each High strategy. In particular, we can
interpret each ¯ p as representing an adversary whose probabilistic behaviour may be responsible
for setting up a covert channel from High to Low. The PNI deﬁnition takes into account a
family APNI of adversaries (against which PNI checks the presence of information ﬂows from
High to Low) that turn out to be:
² active: an adversary can alter the probabilistic low-level behaviour of the system, since
the application of the hiding operator aﬀects the probability distribution of the generative
low-level actions.
² memoryless: an adversary cannot alter its strategy step by step, since the probability dis-
tribution of the hidden high-level inputs, expressed by parameters p1;:::;pn and chosen by
the adversary, does not change during the system execution.
If PNI holds, Low cannot infer the behaviour of any adversary in APNI, that means the system
does not leak information from High to Low.
As shown in [A+03,ABG03], probabilistic noninterference reveals covert channels that are
not observable in a purely nondeterministic setting, and oﬀers the means for measuring the
information leakage in terms of probability of observing the related covert channel. We now
provide some examples showing the expressive power of PNI.
Example 3.2 Consider process P
∆ = h¤:(l¤:0 + l0
¤:0) + (l¤:0 + l0
¤:0), which may accept a high-
level input of type h before interacting with Low through one of the low-level actions, l¤ or
l0
¤. From the viewpoint of Low, the observable interface of the system cannot be altered by
the strategy followed by High. This is reﬂected by the security check, which states that P
satisﬁes the PNI property, since (l¤:0 + l0
¤:0) ¼PB ¿:(l¤:0 + l0
¤:0) +p (l¤:0 + l0
¤:0) for any choice
of parameter p.
An example of an information ﬂow from High to Low is given by the following process
P
∆ = l:(h¤:0 + l0:0) + l0:l:0. If P produces the sequence of low-level outputs l0:l, then High
cannot interact with the system and no information can ﬂow from High to Low. Instead, if the
system ﬁrst chooses l, then High can be responsible for deciding whether l0 will be executed.
Formally, l:l0:0 + l0:l:0, which expresses the semantics of Pnfhg, is not weak probabilistic
bisimilar to l:(¿:0 +p l0:0) + l0:l:0, which expresses the semantics of P=
p
h. In particular, they
cannot be equivalent for any choice of parameter p of the hiding operator. The same example
revisited in a nondeterministic scenario reveals the same covert channel described above, which
turns out to be a purely possibilistic information ﬂow.
An example of a probabilistic information leakage is given by the process P
∆ = l:h:l0:0 +
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(l:l0:0+l:0). The behaviour of High does not aﬀect the set of possible results, l:l0 or l, observable
by Low. However, High can alter the probability distribution of such results. Formally, a
probabilistic covert channel is captured by the PNI property, since l:0 + (l:l0:0 + l:0), which
is the semantics of Pnfhg, is equivalent to l:l0:0 +1=4 l:0, and P
∆ = l:¿:l0:0 + (l:l0:0 + l:0),
which is the semantics of P=h, is equivalent to l:l0:0 +3=4 l:0. Hence, Pnfhg and P=h are not
weak probabilistic bisimilar. From a statistical viewpoint, if High interferes and Low observes
repeated executions of P, then, on average, the result of 3
4 ¢ n experiments over n will be l:l0.
On the other hand, the same observation occurs 1
4 ¢ n times over n (on average) in the case
High does not interact with P. From the viewpoint of Low, a small number of experiments is
suﬃcient to guess the behaviour of High (see [A+03] for a mathematical justiﬁcation of this
statistical interpretation).
The following example shows an application of the noninterference general idea to study
interferences between honest users and malicious parties (see, e.g., [FGM00] for an application
of the noninterference approach to the analysis of cryptographic protocols).
Example 3.3 Let us assume that Low represents a user that interacts with the system in
order to obtain a service, while High is a potential adversary interacting with the system
with some malicious intentions. In particular, we consider an abstraction of a low-level shared
resource with password-based access. Low can access and consume the resource, while High is
not allowed to. In spite of this, High can try to guess the access password in order to consume
the resource in place of Low. The overall system is given by the parallel composition of two
processes, LU kAct Resource, where LU expresses the behaviour of the low-level user:
LU
∆ = low request :low insert password :low consume resource :0 +
low not available¤ :0
and Resource models the shared resource that reacts to external requests, which may arrive
either from LU or from the high-level adversary:
Resource
∆ = low request¤ :low insert password¤ :low consume resource¤ :0 +
high request¤ :(high try password¤ :high consume resource¤ :
low not available :0 +q
high try password¤ :Resource)
In the absence of the adversary, Low can normally access and consume the resource. Formally,
(LU kAct Resource)nHigh does not enable the action low not available. On the other hand,
if High tries to interfere, then Low may not be able to access the resource. In particular,
we have that (LU kAct Resource)=
p
high request=high try password=high consume resource reaches the null
term by performing sequences of the form ¿¤low not available with probability p ¢ q ¢
P1
i=0(p ¢
(1 ¡ q))i =
p¢q
1¡p+p¢q. Note that when hiding the action of type high request, parameter p of
the hiding operator is used to resolve the choice between the resulting invisible action and
the synchronising action low request. On the other hand, when hiding the action of type
high try password (resp. high consume resource) the parameter of the hiding operator is not
used, since the system performs an action of this type with probability 1.
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4 Measuring Noninterference
In this section we show how to exploit the probabilistic information associated with the be-
haviour of a system in order to give a quantitative estimate of possible information leakages.
This gives us a means to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of a covert channel that is responsible for
an illegal information ﬂow. As shown in [A+03], this is related to the number of tests (system
executions) needed to an external observer for detecting such an information ﬂow.
The technique we are going to introduce aims at quantifying the information leakage of a
system by calculating the maximal diﬀerence between the transition probabilities observed by
a low-level user when the system is interacting with High and when it is not, respectively. As
a consequence a basic requirement for this technique is that the systems we analyse are fully
speciﬁed from the viewpoint of a low-level observer. This means that the nondeterminism due
to possible interactions with the environment has to be resolved. In fact, this is the eﬀect of
the hiding operator when turning reactive actions into generative internal actions. Since in
our modelling of the PNI property hiding is applied only to high-level actions, we only need
to assure that these are the only reactive transitions enabled by the system. We think that
this assumption is not restrictive, since a quantitative estimate of a covert channel observed by
Low really makes sense if (i) the behaviour of Low is fully speciﬁed and (ii) we use a technique
that takes into account all the possible ways in which the behaviour of High may inﬂuence the
probability distribution of the low-level events. Our approach would be applicable also to the
general case of systems including low-level reactive actions, provided that we complicated the
model in order to consider all the possible associated interactions.
The probability of observing an information ﬂow from high level to low level can be es-
timated by relaxing the behavioural equivalence relation expressed by the weak probabilistic
bisimulation deﬁned in Section 2.3. The intuitive idea, inspired by [A+03,ABG03], is as fol-
lows. According to the PNI property introduced in Section 3, a process P is not secure if the
low-level models corresponding to the behaviours of P with and without High interferences
are not equivalent in the probabilistic weak bisimulation semantics. Therefore, an information
leakage is detected when, for a given sequence ¯ p chosen by High, for each equivalence relation
R µ G £ G including the pair (PnHigh;P=
¯ p
¯ hP), there exist C 2 G=R, a 2 GAct, and a pair
(P 0;P 00) 2 R, such that
Prob(P
0;¿
¤a;C) 6= Prob(P
00;¿
¤a;C):
The diﬀerence between these two probabilities can be used to give an estimate of the amount
of information leakage. More precisely, for every equivalence relation R including the pair
(PnHigh;P=
¯ p
¯ hP), we consider the pair of states (of a class in G=R) where the weak transition
probabilities are maximally diﬀerent and calculate the diﬀerence. We can then deﬁne a measure
of the security of P as the minimal of these diﬀerences over all equivalence relations.
More formally, we deﬁne the quantity ±R
¯ p (P) (or simply ±R
¯ p when process P is clear from the
context), which expresses the behavioural distance between the low-level models PnHigh and
P=
¯ p
¯ hP of a system P with respect to a given relation R µ G£G including the pair (PnHigh;P=
¯ p
¯ hP)
and a particular choice of the sequence of parameters ¯ p = p1;:::;pn governing the interaction
of each high-level input action of P with High.
Deﬁnition 4.1 Let P be a process, R µ G £ G an equivalence relation including the pair
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(PnHigh;P=
¯ p
¯ hP), and ¯ p = p1;:::;pn a sequence of parameters such that pi 2 (0;1);1 · i · n.
We deﬁne
±
R
¯ p = sup
(P 0;P 00) 2 R
a 2 GAct
C 2 G=R
jProb(P
0;¿
¤a;C) ¡ Prob(P
00;¿
¤a;C)j:
By using this quantity we can then deﬁne a measure for the security degree of a system P as
follows.
Deﬁnition 4.2 Let P be a process and let R, ¯ p and ±R
¯ p as in Deﬁnition 4.1. Then we deﬁne
"¯ p = inf R ±
R
¯ p :
The quantity "¯ p expresses the maximal distance between the process without High interferences
and the process interacting with the high-level user modelled by sequence ¯ p, obtained for the
particular relation that is the best approximation of a weak probabilistic bisimulation. We
point out that this quantity depends on parameters p1;:::;pn forming the sequence ¯ p. These
parameters represent an hypothetical high-level adversary that can pass to Low an amount
of information according to the quantity "¯ p. The measure "¯ p can also be interpreted as the
“eﬀectiveness” of the adversary strategy corresponding to the sequence ¯ p. In fact, it determines
how easy it is for a low-level user to obtain some conﬁdential information, in terms of the number
of tests (system executions) the low-level user needs to perform in order to distinguish the
behaviours with and without the interference of such an adversary. This number of tests can be
analysed by using various standard statistical methods, such as the so-called hypothesis testing
method [Shao99]. This method provides a simple way to estimate how many tests are needed to
distinguish two processes and the conﬁdence that the tests outcome is correct. The application
of this method for a statistical interpretation of the approximation of conﬁnement properties
was ﬁrst described in [DHW02]; a detailed description of this statistical interpretation in our
process algebraic setting can be found in [A+03].
In [A+03,ABG03] an approximated notion of noninterference is proposed by employing a
relaxed version of the weak probabilistic bisimulation ¼PB, termed weak probabilistic bisimu-
lation with "-precision (¼PB"), which is a non-transitive relation formally deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 4.3 A relation R µ G £ G is a weak probabilistic bisimulation with "-precision,
where " 2 (0;1), if and only if, whenever (P;Q) 2 R, then for all C 2 G=R :
² jProb(P;¿¤a;C) ¡ Prob(Q;¿¤a;C)j · " 8a 2 GAct
² jProb(P;a¤;C) ¡ Prob(Q;a¤;C)j · " 8a¤ 2 RAct:
If P ¼PB" Q then there exists a weak probabilistic bisimulation with "-precision including the
pair (P;Q).
By replacing ¼PB by ¼PB" in the PNI deﬁnition, we obtain a relaxed property that checks
whether a system P is an approximated version of a secure system up to a tolerance ". We
recall that in this section we apply the security check to fully generative processes, since the
systems we consider do not enable reactive low-level transitions. Hence, the veriﬁcation of the
condition of Deﬁnition 4.3 is applied to the generative actions a 2 GAct only.
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With respect to the PNI security check based on Deﬁnition 4.3, in this section we have
proposed a speciﬁc notion of measure "¯ p of the security of a system P against the adversary
corresponding to sequence ¯ p. An important consequence of Deﬁnitions 4.1 and 4.2 is that
P turns out to be approximately secure (up to ") against the adversary modelled by ¯ p –
namely there exists a relation including the pair (PnHigh;P=
¯ p
¯ hP) that is a weak probabilistic
bisimulation with "-precision – if and only if "¯ p is less than ".
Proposition 4.4 Let P be a process and "¯ p as in Deﬁnition 4.2. Then
(i) PnHigh ¼PB"¯ p P=
¯ p
¯ hP.
(ii) PnHigh ¼PB" P=
¯ p
¯ hP for each " > "¯ p.
(iii) There does not exist " < "¯ p such that PnHigh ¼PB" P=
¯ p
¯ hP.
Proof. We immediately derive (i) from Deﬁnitions 4.2, 4.1 and from the deﬁnition of weak
probabilistic bisimulation with "-precision. Condition (ii) simply holds if we take the relation R
such that "¯ p = ±R
¯ p . Finally, to derive (iii), it suﬃces to observe that if such an " exists, then there
also exists a relation R0 including the pair (PnHigh;P=
¯ p
¯ hP) such that, whenever (P 0;P 00) 2 R0,
for each C 2 G=R0 it holds that jProb(P 0;¿¤a;C) ¡ Prob(P 00;¿¤a;C)j · " 8a 2 GAct. That
means ±R0
¯ p · ", thus violating the hypothesis that "¯ p is the minimum, over all relations R, of
the family of values ±R
¯ p . 2
As we have seen, PNI checks whether the system is secure against a class APNI of ad-
versaries, among which we are interested in evaluating the eﬀectiveness of the adversary that
maximises the information leakage, i.e. the most powerful adversary. Formally, if ¯ q = q1;:::;qn
is the sequence representing such an adversary, we have that "¯ q = sup¯ p "¯ p. The problem of
estimating the most eﬀective adversary corresponds to the problem of ﬁnding the least upper
bound of the function "¯ p.
4.1 Examples
We now provide some intuitive examples that explain the role of our approximation in estimat-
ing the security degree of systems and determining the worst case, i.e. the maximal information
leakage that the class of adversaries deﬁned by PNI may set up from high level to low level.
Example 4.5 Process P
∆ = h¤:l +¿:(h¤:l0:0+l:0) performs either a high-level input operation
of type h or an internal move. Such a choice is nondeterministic, as it depends on the behaviour
of High. Then, if the action ¿ is executed, another nondeterministic choice is to be performed
between the high-level input operation of type h and a low-level output l. Note that an
information ﬂow from High to Low occurs if the action l0 is observed by Low, as l0 is executed
only if High interacts with the system. On the other hand, the execution of l does not reveal
anything about the strategy followed by High. In Figure 1 we show the labeled transition
systems modelling the low-level views of P to be compared through equivalence checking. The
left-hand system represents the behaviour of PnHigh. The right-hand system expresses what
Low can observe in the case High decides to interact with P, i.e. P=
p
h. In such a case, each
nondeterministic choice is probabilistically resolved by High according to parameter p. In other
words, each p 2 (0;1) expresses a high-level strategy followed by the adversary.
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¿ ²²
²2
l ²²
²3
²10
¿;p
~~}}}}}}} ¿;1¡p
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²20
l
²²
²30
¿;p
~~}}}}}}} l;1¡p
ÃÃ A A A A A A A
²40 ²50
l0
²²
²60
²70
Fig. 1. Process h¤:l + ¿:(h¤:l0:0 + l:0): what Low can observe with or without High interactions.
Transition probabilities are omitted when equal to 1.
Let us consider the most relevant equivalence relations.
For R1 = ff1;10g;f2;20;30g;C = f50g;f3;40;60;70gg we have
±
R1
p = jProb(2;¿
¤;C) ¡ Prob(3
0;¿
¤;C)j = j0 ¡ pj = p;
and for R2 = ff1;10g;C = f2;20g;f30g;f50g;f3;40;60;70gg we have
±
R2
p = jProb(1;¿
¤;C) ¡ Prob(1
0;¿
¤;C)j = 1 ¡ p
from which we derive "p = minfp;1 ¡ pg. That means the probabilistic behaviour of High
directly aﬀects the capability of distinguishing between the two low-level views of the system.
In order to evaluate the worst case, we maximise function "p, thus obtaining p = 1
2, for which
we have "p = 1
2. In fact, it is easy to see that 8p 6= 1
2, "p < 1
2. We can then conclude that the
most powerful adversary is the high-level user expressed by parameter p = 1
2. In the statistical
interpretation mentioned above, where "p is inversely proportional to the number of tests the
adversary has to perform to breach the security of the system, the most powerful adversary
is the attacker which needs the minimal number of tests. In particular, assume that the most
powerful adversary, modelled by parameter p = 1
2, is interacting with the system. By applying
the technique explained in [A+03], we obtain that the probability for a low-level observer
of guessing the activity of such a high-level user is about 96:5% after 10 tests. As another
example, consider the high-level user modelled by parameter p = 0:01. Such an adversary
interferes with the system in a way that is rarely revealed by the low-level observer. Indeed,
in order to correctly guess the behaviour of such an adversary with the same probability of
success as above, the observer needs about 1312 tests, while after 10 tests such a probability
is about 56%, which is a value very close to the success probability of a blind guess.
Example 4.6 Consider the second process of Example 3.2, P
∆ = l:(h¤:0 + l0:0) + l0:l:0. The
low-level models to be compared are l:l0:0 + l0:l:0 and l:(¿:0 +p l0:0) + l0:l:0, which, as we have
seen, cannot be weakly bisimulation equivalent (see Fig. 2). In particular, the distinguishing
behaviour arises if we execute l with probability 1
2. In fact, after such an event the former
process executes the action l0 with probability 1, while the latter process executes either an
internal move with probability p or the action l0 with probability 1 ¡ p.
Formally, for R1 = ff1;10g;f2;20g;f3;30g;C = f4;5;40;50;60gg we have
±
R1
p = jProb(2;¿
¤l
0;C) ¡ Prob(2
0;¿
¤l
0;C)j = j1 ¡ (1 ¡ p)j = p;
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~~| | | | | ¿;p
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Fig. 2. Two low-level views of process l:(h¤:0 + l0:0) + l0:l:0
and for R2 = ff1;10g;C = f2g;f20g;f3;30g;f4;5;40;50;60gg we have
±
R2
p = jProb(1;¿
¤l;C) ¡ Prob(1
0;¿
¤l;C)j =
1
2
:
Since for any relation R diﬀerent from R1 and R2 we have ±R
p ¸ 1
2, it follows "p = minf1
2;pg.
Note that the information leakage is negligible as p tends to zero, because in such a case also "p
tends to zero. That means High is not interfering (rarely interferes) with the system. Clearly,
the closer p is to 1, the easier it is for Low to reveal the behaviour of High. However, even for
the worst case (corresponding to the limiting scenario p = 1), we have "p = 1
2, i.e. the maximal
probability of observing an information leakage depends on the probability of reaching the
state where High can actually interfere.
Example 4.7 Consider the shared low-level resource described in Example 3.3. The low-level
views to be compared through equivalence checking are depicted in Fig. 3.
If, for instance, we take the relation R1 = ff1;10g;f2;20g;f3;30g;f4;40g;C = f50g;f60;70gg,
we obtain
±
R1
p = jProb(1;¿
¤;C) ¡ Prob(1
0;¿
¤;C)j = p:
Instead, for R2 = ff1;10;50g;f2;20g;f3;30g;f4;40g;C = f60;70gg, from Example 3.3 we derive
±
R2
p = jProb(1;¿
¤;C) ¡ Prob(5
0;¿
¤;C)j = q ¢
1 X
i=0
(p ¢ (1 ¡ q))
i =
q
1 ¡ p + p ¢ q
:
Moreover, it can be veriﬁed that considering other relations is not meaningful if we want to
estimate "p. Hence, we have
"p = minfp;
q
1 ¡ p + p ¢ q
g:
We recall that q is the probability of guessing the password and p is the parameter of the
hiding operator, which guides the choice between low-level access requests and high-level access
requests. Therefore, it is easy to verify that if High lets parameter p tend to 1 then "p tends
to 1. That means if the low-level access request is always preempted by the high-level access
request, High will always succeed in guessing the password and consuming the resource.
5 The Measure "¯ p and Operator Norms
The quantity "¯ p introduced in the previous section is based on a “behavioural distance” be-
tween processes deﬁned by considering all possible equivalence relations. We now give a more
formal justiﬁcation of such a distance in terms of an appropriate metric on the space of the
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Fig. 3. Low-level views for the shared resource example.
processes in the calculus deﬁned in Section 2.1. We use to this purpose the linear operators
framework introduced in [DHW03a,DHW03] for deﬁning approximate process equivalences. In
this framework, the operational semantics of a probabilistic process is described by a linear
operator representing its transition graph, and the distance between processes is deﬁned via
the notion of operator norm. In the following, we ﬁrst re-cast our security framework based
on weak probabilistic bisimulation in this linear operators setting, and then we show that the
quantity "¯ p corresponds to a particular operator norm which captures the idea of behavioural
distance introduced in Section 4.
5.1 Weak Probabilistic Bisimulation via Linear Operators
We will base our treatment on the basic assumption introduced in Section 4 that systems are
fully speciﬁed from the viewpoint of a low-level observer or, in other words, all choices are
probabilistic after the potential interaction of the system with High has been resolved. As a
consequence, we can actually consider as a reference model a restriction of the model introduced
in Section 2 where only generative transitions are executable. More precisely, we can refer to
a restricted version of the labelled transition system (G;Act;T) that considers fully generative
processes only.
Based on such a restriction, as described in [DHW03], where fully probabilistic processes
are considered, we can associate to the probabilistic relation T the following linear operator:
M(T) =
M
a2GAct
Ma(T);
where for all a 2 GAct and P;Q 2 G, the matrix deﬁned by:
(Ma(T))PQ =
X
fq j there exists P
a;q
¡ ¡ ¡! Q and q 6= 0g
represents a one step transition on action a 2 GAct in the transition system (G;GAct;T). Note
that if there are no transitions from P to Q then (Ma(T))PQ = 0, as the sum over an empty
set is 0. The symbol © represents the direct sum operation deﬁned for a given set fMigk
i=1 of
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ni £ mi matrices by the (
Pk
i=1 ni) £ (
Pk
i=1 mi) matrix:
M
i
Mi =
0
B
B
B
B
B
B
@
M1 0 0 ::: 0
0 M2 0 ::: 0
. . .
. . .
. . . ... . . .
0 0 0 ::: Mk
1
C
C
C
C
C
C
A
:
For a given process P we denote by M(P) the associated transition matrix. This is a n£n
matrix, where n is the cardinality of the set SP µ G of the processes which can be reached by
a computation starting from P.
These linear operators are deﬁned on the vector space V(G) containing all distributions over
the set of states (processes) G, which is the space of all formal linear combinations of elements
in G with coeﬃcients in R. For the sake of simplicity we assume that the set G is ﬁnite so that
we can restrict ourself, for the time being, to consider only ﬁnite-dimensional vector spaces
and ﬁnite-dimensional linear operators. The results we present can nevertheless be extended
to the general inﬁnite case along the lines of [DHW03].
Our aim is to re-formulate the weak probabilistic bisimulation semantics introduced in
Section 2.3 in terms of the above deﬁned linear operators M(P) representing the operational
semantics of a process P. In order to take into account transitions involving sequences of ¿ ac-
tions (the Milner “double arrow relation”) we extend the single step operator M =
L
a2GAct Ma
to encode transitions on strings ¾ 2 GAct
¤ of ﬁnite length as follows:
S¾ = Ma1Ma2 :::Man; and S" = I;
where " denotes the empty sequence in GAct
¤.
In order to express the condition for weak probabilistic bisimulation in Deﬁnition 2.3
(ﬁrst equation), we now need to deﬁne an operator which encodes probabilities of the form
Prob(P;¿¤a;C), with C an equivalence class in a given relation R µ G £ G. As shown in
[DHW03], equivalence relations are in a one-to-one correspondence with a particular class of
linear operators called classiﬁcation operators: if ¼ is an equivalence relation on a set X, then
there is a classiﬁcation operator K : V(X) ! V(X=¼), and vice versa. Note that K is a n£m
matrix, where n is the cardinality of the set X (i.e. the dimension of the space V(X)) and m
is the number of ¼-equivalence classes in the partition of X (i.e. the dimension of the space
V(X=¼)).
By using classiﬁcation matrices we can now express the probability Prob(P;¾;C), where
¾ 2 GAct
¤ and C 2 G=R for some equivalence relation represented by K, by the operator
S¾K. In particular, we have that Prob(P;¾;C) = (S¾K)P;C.
We can then re-phrase Lemma 2.2 by stating that probabilities Prob(P;¿¤a;C), with a 2
GAct, resolve the equation system:
(S¿¤aK)P;C =
8
> > > <
> > > :
1 if a = ¿ ^ P 2 C
(M¿ ¢ S¿¤K)P;C if a = ¿ ^ P 62 C
(M¿ ¢ S¿¤aK)P;C + (Ma)P;C if a 6= ¿
For ¾ = a1a2 :::an 2 GAct
n, we denote by P¾(P;KP) the operator S(P)¾KP, where
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S(P)¾ = M(P)a1M(P)a2 :::M(P)an is the restriction of S to the states reachable by P. The
matrix KP is a restricted matrix K, where all the rows corresponding to states which are not
reachable by P have been eliminated. So KP is a nP £ m matrix, where nP is the number of
states reachable by P. We will also denote by P¿¤a(P;KP) the operator S¿¤aK restricted to
P.
Given a n£m matrix K and n0 ¸ n we deﬁne the completion to n0, ¯ K, of K as the n0 £m
matrix:
¯ K = K © On0¡n;
where Ok indicates the k-dimensional null matrix, that is the k £ k matrix with only zero
entries. We will use this operation to deﬁne a process which operates on the same number
of abstract states (or classes, represented by the columns) as K but without any transitions
between the “extra” n0 ¡ n states.
The weak probabilistic bisimulation relation introduced in [BH97] can now be formulated
in a linear operator setting as follows:
Deﬁnition 5.1 Let P;Q 2 G be two processes and let nP and nQ be the number of states
reachable by P and Q respectively. Then P and Q are weak probabilistic bisimilar iﬀ there
exists an n £ m classiﬁcation matrix K with n = nP + nQ such that
¯ P¿¤a(P;KP) = ¯ P¿¤a(Q;KQ) for all a 2 GAct;
where ¯ P¿¤a(P;KP) and ¯ P¿¤a(Q;KQ) are the completions to n of P¿¤a(P;KP) and P¿¤a(Q;KQ)
respectively.
This deﬁnition corresponds to (the ﬁrst equation of) Deﬁnition 2.3 in the restricted case of
fully speciﬁed processes.
5.2 A Metric for Weak Probabilistic Bisimulation
In this section we show that the quantity "¯ p introduced in Section 4 as a measure for the
conﬁnement of a given system, corresponds to the notion of distance induced by a particular
operator norm. In general, the norm of an operator describes the maximal “stretching factor”
of normalised vectors. We formally deﬁne it after recalling the basic deﬁnition of a vector
norm:
Deﬁnition 5.2 A norm on a vector space V is a map k:k : V 7! R such that:
(i) k~ xk ¸ 0 ,
(ii) k~ xk = 0 , ~ x = ~ o,
(iii) k®~ xk = j®jk~ xk,
(iv) k~ x + ~ yk · k~ xk + k~ yk,
with ~ o 2 V the null vector.
Given a normed vector space V the operator norm for linear operators on V is deﬁned by:
kMk = sup
~ x2V
kM(~ x)k
k~ xk
= sup
k~ xk=1
kM(~ x)k:
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The exact numerical value of an operator norm depends, of course, on the particular vector
norm used. We will consider the supremum norm deﬁned by
k~ xk1 = k(xi)ik1 = sup
i
jxij;
and use the corresponding operator norm to deﬁne a metric on the set of linear operators
representing the semantics of our probabilistic processes.
Deﬁnition 5.3 Let S be the set
S = fL : V(G) ! V(G=R) j R is an equivalence relationg:
We deﬁne the metric d on S as the metric induced by the supremum operator norm:
d(L1;L2) = kL1 ¡ L2k1:
This metric is particularly suited for expressing the notion of behavioural distance intro-
duced in Section 4. In particular, it can be used to calculate the values of the quantity ±R
¯ p of
Deﬁnition 4.1, as shown in the following.
We recall that in order to verify the PNI property for a given a system P, we check whether
the two models P1 ´ PnHigh and P2 ´ P=
p1
hP
1 :::=
pn
hP
n are weak probabilistic bisimilar for all
probabilities ¯ p = p1;:::;pn. This equivalence checking can be performed by comparing for
each equivalence relation R on the set S = SP1 [ SP2 of the states reached by both P1 and
P2 (or, equivalently, for each classiﬁcation matrix K on the vector space V(S)) the operators
¯ P¿¤a(P1;KP1) and ¯ P¿¤a(P2;KP2), cf. Deﬁnition 5.1. If we use the distance d of Deﬁnition 5.3
then the outcome of this comparison is a numerical quantity which coincides with the measure
"¯ p.
Proposition 5.4 Let P 2 G, P1 ´ PnHigh and P2 ´ P=
p1
hP
1
:::=
pn
hP
n, with ¯ p = p1;:::;pn a
sequence of parameters such that pi 2 (0;1);1 · i · n. Let R µ G £ G be an equivalence
relation on the set S = SP1 [ SP2 µ G, and let K be the corresponding classiﬁcation matrix.
Then
±
R
¯ p = max
a2GAct
d(¯ P¿¤a(P1;KP1); ¯ P¿¤a(P2;KP2));
where KP1 and KP2 are the restrictions of K to the states in SP1 and SP2 respectively.
Proof. Let ~ x be a normalised vector in V(S). Then the vector
¯ P¿¤a(P1;KP1)~ x ¡ ¯ P¿¤a(P2;KP2)~ x
is the vector in V(S=R) whose components are the diﬀerence of the probabilities of going
from each state in S to each equivalence class via the sequence ¿¤a, for a given a 2 GAct.
Now observe that the choice of vector ~ x corresponds to the choice of the pair (P 0;P 00) in
Deﬁnition 4.1. Moreover, since GAct is ﬁnite, the least upper bound is actually the maximal
element of the set. Then the thesis follows from the deﬁnition of the supremum operator norm.
2
If for some K this distance is zero for all sequences ¯ p, then we can conclude that P is
secure (according to Deﬁnition 5.1 and the deﬁnition of PNI property). Otherwise, we can
consider the relation K which minimises the distance d(¯ p). This corresponds to the quantity
"¯ p in Deﬁnition 4.2:
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Corollary 5.5 Let P be a process and let R, ¯ p as in Proposition 5.4. Then
"¯ p = inf
K
d(¯ P¿¤a(P1;KP1); ¯ P¿¤a(P2;KP2)):
6 Conclusion and Related Work
We have introduced a formal deﬁnition of the amount of information ﬂowing in a system
from High to Low, based on a notion of process similarity corresponding to an approximate
probabilistic version of the weak bisimulation of [Mil89]. Our approach is able to detect and
measure probabilistic covert channels from High to Low, by comparing the eﬀect on the low-
level view of the absence/presence of the high-level user.
A diﬀerent approach aiming to the same objective of quantifying information ﬂow has been
proposed in [Lowe02], where the “quantity” is deﬁned in terms of the behaviours of the high-
level user that are distinguishable from a low-level user point of view. This approach does not
consider probabilistic behaviours; instead it relies on a worst case analysis based on all possible
ways to resolve nondeterminism.
Another related approach is the one presented in [CHM01], where the amount of conﬁdential
information which may be leaked by programs written in a simple imperative language is
analysed by using Shannon’s information theory.
Desharnais et al. [D+02] propose an extension of [D+00] by deﬁning a ﬁxed-point characteri-
sation of a pseudometric for approximating weak bisimulation, where zero distance corresponds
to weak bisimilarity. A quantitative meaning of such a metric is that nearby processes have
nearby propensities to leak information. The metric is deﬁned in the context of the alter-
nating model for labelled concurrent Markov chains (LCMCs). In a LCMC states are either
probabilistic or nondeterministic. Transitions from probabilistic states are not labelled and
are associated with a probability distribution on the set of reachable nondeterministic states.
Transitions from nondeterministic states are labelled and ﬁnitely branching and lead to prob-
abilistic states. The probability of reaching a state through a weak transition is computed by
taking the supremum over all possible computations, where a computation is a purely prob-
abilistic transition system obtained by resolving the nondeterministic choices as follows: for
each nondeterministic state at most one outgoing transition is picked up. With respect to such
a framework, in our model states can have both probabilistic and nondeterministic choices, de-
pending on the nature of the interactions with the environment. Then, before computing the
distance between diﬀerent processes, nondeterminism is resolved through a probabilistic sched-
uler rather than in a deterministic way. The notion of pseudometric of [D+02] is strictly related
to the notion of channel capacity from information theory [CT91]. On the other hand, our
notion of conﬁnement between processes provides a natural statistical interpretation, in terms
of number of experiments that are needed on average to distinguish conﬁned processes [A+03].
Moreover, we have shown that our measure of the security degree of systems has a formal inter-
pretation as the metric induced by the norm of a linear operator associated to our probabilistic
processes.
Other works deal with approximate reasoning in order to obtain a relaxed notion of truth
- the goal is moving from a qualitative scenario where f0;1g are the unique truth values to
a quantitative scenario where the interval [0;1] is given as the collection of the truth val-
ues. Along this line, several approaches are investigated in [Koz81,JS90,BW01], which are
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not related to information ﬂow capacity issues. Finally, in [L+98] an asymptotic notion of
probabilistic equivalence is deﬁned to estimate a secrecy property. In particular, in the setting
of a variant of spi-calculus, observational equivalence is expressed in terms of indistinguisha-
bility by polynomial time statistical tests. Then, secrecy is checked by verifying whether the
protocol under analysis is observationally equivalent to an idealized protocol. With respect
to our framework, probabilities are intended as a means for a polynomial time treatment of
cryptographic primitives and do not come into play in the modelling of the protocol behaviour.
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